Last data update: May 06, 2024. (Total: 46732 publications since 2009)
Records 1-2 (of 2 Records) |
Query Trace: McClee V[original query] |
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Monitoring laboratory occupational exposures to Burkholderia pseudomallei
Clay LA , Straub KW , Adrianos SL , Daniels J , Blackwell JL , Bryant LT , McClee V , Green JA , Edwin SS . Appl Biosaf 2022 27 (2) 84-91 Background: Burkholderia pseudomallei is a Tier 1 overlap select agent and subject to the select agent regulations (42 CFR §73 and 9 CFR §121). It is a gram-negative, motile, soil saprophyte, and the etiologic agent of melioidosis. B. pseudomallei infection can produce systemic illness and can be fatal in the absence of appropriate treatment. Laboratory exposures involving this organism may occur when appropriate containment measures are not employed. Current disease treatment inadequacies and the risk factors associated with melioidosis make this an agent of primary concern in research, commercial, and clinical laboratory environments. Results: This study presents data reported to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Division of Select Agents and Toxins for releases involving B. pseudomallei in 2017-2019 that occurred in Biosafety Level (BSL)-2 and BSL-3 laboratories. Fifty-one Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)/CDC Form 3 release reports led to the medical surveillance of 275 individuals. Entities offered post-exposure prophylaxis to ?76% of the individuals impacted in the presented events. Summary: Laboratory safety can be improved by implementing appropriate safety precautions to minimize exposures. Most of the incidents discussed in this evidence-based report occurred during work conducted in the absence of primary containment. None of the releases resulted in illness, death, or transmission to or among workers, nor was there transmission outside of a laboratory into the surrounding environment or community. Effective risk assessment and management strategies coupled with standard and special microbiological policies and procedures can result in reduced exposures and improved safety at facilities. © Copyright 2022, ABSA International 2022 2022. |
Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins: 2003-2013
Shelby BD , Cartagena D , McClee V , Gangadharan D , Weyant R . Health Secur 2015 13 (4) 256-66 The Federal Select Agent Program, which is composed of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Division of Select Agents and Toxins and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Agricultural Select Agent Services, regulates entities that possess, use, or transfer biological select agents and toxins in the United States and must preapprove all transfers within or into the US. The requirement to preapprove transfers allows the Federal Select Agent Program to monitor and track shipments to receive alerts of theft, loss, or release during shipment, thereby protecting public health and safety. As part of the program, the Division of Select Agents and Toxins regulates biological select agents and toxins that have been identified by the US government as posing a severe threat to public health and safety. The division analyzed 4,402 transfers that occurred between March 2003 and December 2013 to identify frequently transferred biological select agents and toxins and the types of entities involved in transfers. During the study period, 1 package was lost during shipment and it was determined not to pose a threat to public health. The Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated the loss and concluded that the package was most likely damaged by the commercial carrier and discarded. Further, there were no reports of theft or release associated with biological select agents and toxins shipments. This report represents the first in-depth review of biological select agent and toxin transfers that were approved by the Division of Select Agents and Toxins. |
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